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Abstract—On today’s Web, users trade access to their private
data for content and services. Advertising sustains the business
model of many websites and applications. Efficient and successful
advertising relies on predicting users’ actions and tastes to
suggest a range of products to buy. It follows that, while surfing
the Web users leave traces regarding their identity in the form
of activity patterns and unstructured data. We analyse how
advertising networks build user footprints and how the suggested
advertising reacts to changes in the user behaviour.
I. INTRODUCTION
Websites use personalisation services to profile their vis-
itors, collect their in page reading activities and eventually
use this data to provide tailored suggestions. Among the
data analysed by websites are also included user preferences
and social connections. These can be obtained by tracking
users across different applications and sites through cookies
or open web sessions. Even if the user does not accept
cookies or is not logged into a service account, such as their
Google, Twitter or Facebook accounts, the web page and third
party services can still try to profile them by using third-
party http requests, among other techniques. Within the http
request various selectors can be included to communicate
user preferences or particular features, in the form of url
variables. Features that might be used by advertising networks
and malicious trackers include personalised language or fonts
settings, browser extensions, in page keywords and so on.
These features are then used to identify individual users by
restricting the pool of possible candidates among all the
visitors in a certain time frame. Unique users can then be
distinguished across multiple devices or sessions.
A. Contribution
We have observed how users are tracked across the Web
and how the displayed advertising is tailored even after they
have visited a few websites with a certain interest bias.
In our study we analyse how the user profile detected by
advertising services can be used to estimate the user privacy
risk on a certain network. In our study we analyse how
advertising networks identify a user and start tracking them.
We measure the distance between the observed user profile and
the advertising profile, by categorising the set of keywords sent
by advertising networks through third-party http requests. We
introduce a set of metrics to express this distance between the
two profiles.
It is important to note that we have considered the case
for which users are not registering, neither connecting any
external account, as it could be the case with services like:
Facebook, Google+, Twitter, and so on. In such scenario we
have measured how these networks still attempt to track the
user by sending user information through http requests to their
services.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
1) An analysis of how tracking happens on the web, for
users who are not logged in and based on real browsing
patterns, taking as sample Google services.
2) A model of the user online footprint that is able to ex-
pose how each website and tracking network categorise
their activities.
3) A measure of how each website affects the advertising
returned from advertising services.
4) A measure of connectivity of malicious trackers across
different websites.
II. BACKGROUND
Information regarding locations, browsing habits, communi-
cation records, health information, financial information, and
general preferences regarding user online and offline activities
are shared by different parties online. This level of access
is often directly granted from the user of such services. In
a wide number of occasion though, private information are
captured by online services without the direct user consent or
even knowledge. We believe that the privacy and sensitiveness
of the information becoming accessible to third parties can be
easily overlooked.
Personal computers and more generally communication
devices that are carried around by people are capable of
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being located, identified and tracked across different locations,
networks and services [1]. All these devices can therefore
be used for a variety of surveillance activities, which are in
itself detrimental to the user’s interests. Until recently in fact,
the cost of surveillance and tracking of people and activities
was proportional to the cost of directly reaching, asking or
following a single person or a group of people. Technology
therefore enhances the surveillance capabilities by introducing
tools that allow the collection of information arising from
a person’s activities. This information can furthermore be
combined and inferred, therefore offering a more complete
picture of that person.
For example, to personalise their services or offer tailored
advertising, web applications could use tracking services that
identify a user through different networks [2] [3]. These
tracking services usually combine information from different
profiles that users create, for example their Gmail address
or their Facebook or LinkedIn accounts. In addition specific
characteristics of the user’s device can be used to identify them
through different sessions and websites, as described by the
Panopticlick project [4].
Browser fingerprinting is a technique implemented by ana-
lytics services and tracking technologies to identify uniquely
a user while they browser different websites. Different fea-
tures of a specific browser setup can be used to identify
uniquely a user. Supported languages, browser extensions
or installed fonts [5] can be used to identify a browser
setup among others. More advanced techniques distinguish
between browsers’ JavaScript execution characteristics [6].
These features are particularly interesting since they are
more difficult to simulate or mitigate in practice. Targeting
JavaScript execution characteristics actually means looking at
the innate performance signature of each browser’s JavaScript
engine, allowing the detection of browser version, operating
system and microarchitecture. These attacks can also work
in situations where traditional forms of system identification
(such as the user-agent header) are modified or hidden. Other
techniques exploit the whitelist mechanism of the popular
NoScript Firefox extension.This mechanism allow the user to
selectively enabling web pages’ scripting privileges to increase
privacy by allowing a site to determine if particular domains
exist in a user’s NoScript whitelist.
It is important to note that while tracking creates serious
privacy concerns for internet users, the customisation of results
is also beneficial to the end user [7]. In fact, while tailored
services offer to the user only information relevant to their
interests, it also allows some companies and institutions to
concentrate an enormous amount of information about in-
ternet users in general. [8] investigate user profiling and
access mechanisms offered by online data aggregator to users’
collected data. Both the collected data and its accuracy was
analysed together with the user’s concerns. In their findings
about 70% of the participants to the study expressed some
concerns about the collection of sensitive data, its level of
detail and how it might be used by third parties, especially for
credit and health information.
It has been shown how most successful tracking networks
exhibit a consistent structure across markets, with a dominant
connected component that, on average, includes 92.8% of
network vertices and 99.8% of the connecting edges [9]. [9]
have measured the chance that a user will become tracked
by all top 10 trackers in approximately 30 clicks on search
results to be of 99.5%. More interesting, [9] have shown
how tracking networks present properties of the small world
networks. Therefore implying a high-level global and local
efficiency in spreading the user information and delivering
targeted ads.
An interesting property of networks to understand their
architecture is the behaviour of the average degree of nearest
neighbours [10] [11]. The average degree of the nearest neigh-
bours of a node knn(k) is a quantity related to the correlations
between the degree of connected vertices [12], since it can
be expressed as the conditional probability that a given vertex
with degree k is connected to a vertex of degree k′. This
property defines if the network in consideration is assortative,
if knn is an increasing function of k or dissortative [13] if it
is not. The property of assortativity has been used in the field
of epidemiology, to help understand how a disease or cure
spreads across a network. It is particularly interesting to note
that assortativity can give a measurement if the removal of a
set of network’s vertices may correspond in curing, vaccinating
or quarantining individuals cells in the network.
Protection techniques against tracking networks are im-
plemented through software agents able to identify if third-
party requests are accessing private data. These agents include
Privacy Badger [14], Mozilla Lightbeam [15], Ghostery [16],
AdBlock [17], and so on. Some of these agents implement
a Tracking Protection Lists (TPL). A TLP can be seen as a
blacklist of identified tracking domains that user might want
to block.
Another interesting aspect of advertising services is how
they are designed to work on feedback loops [18]. An adver-
tising service can in fact be seen as a blackbox providing the
tracker trying to identify or profile the user, and the returned
advertising content. The tracker is used to send information
back to the advertising service, which in response will return
a certain content tailored to the user preferences. Within this
feedback loop different aspect of the user behaviour are taken
in consideration. These include certainly the users browsing
history and their click through rate, i.e. a measurement of the
amount of time users in a population are more likely to interact
with an ad. In more sophisticated advertising solution also user
social connections are taken in consideration.
Advertising therefore services raise the problem of confi-
dentiality of the user reading activity [19]. Up to know an
eloquent example of this problem was provided by the way
public library in the US operates. Reading activities were
considered historically private and were protected through a
set of rules that restricted libraries ability to exploit reading
records.This regime is clearly bypassed when libraries decide
to provide digital services to their users. Digital services
providers and third parties can in fact access users reading
activities without agreeing to the library confidentiality regime.
III. MODELLING THE USER’S FOOTPRINT
We model the user’s activity as series of events belonging
to a certain identity. Each event is a document containing
different information. We can formally defined this as a hy-
permedia document i.e. an object possibly containing graphics,
audio, video, plain text and hyperlinks. We call the hyperlinks
selectors and we use these to build the connections between
the user’s different identities or events. Each identity can be
a profile that the user has created onto a service or platform,
or just a collection of events, revealing something about the
user. With account we mean an application account or a social
network account, such as their LinkedIn or Facebook unique
IDs. An event is an action performed by the user, like visiting
a website.
We aggregate keywords each time the user creates a new
event by visiting a different url. These keywords constitute the
user profile of interests (Figure 1). A tractable model of the
user profile as a probability mass function (PMF) is proposed
in [20], [21] to express how each keyword contributes to
expose how many times the user has indirectly expressed
a preference toward a specific category. We consider that
the user expresses a preference when they visit a webpage
categorised with a certain keywords. This model follows the
intuitive assumption that a particular category is weighted
according to the number of times this has been counted in
the user profile.
We define the profile of a user um as the PMF pm =
(pm,1, . . . , pm,L), conceptually a histogram of relative fre-
quencies of tags across the set of tag categories T .
Similarly, we define the profile of an ads, or third-party http
request, in as the PMF qn = (qn,1, . . . , qn,L), where qn,l is
the percentage of tags belonging to the category l which have
been assigned to this specific advertising item.
Both user and ads profiles can then be seen as normalised
histograms of tags across categories of interest. Our profile
model is in this extent equivalent to the tag clouds that numer-
ous collaborative tagging services use to visualise which tags
are being posted, collaboratively or individually by each user.
A tag cloud, similarly to a histogram, is a visual representation
in which tags are weighted according to their relevance.
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section,
our privacy attacker boils down to an entity that aims to profile
users by representing their interests in the form of normalised
histograms, on the basis of a given categorisation.
A. Third party requests on web pages
When a user visits a web page, the browser sends an http
request to the server to request a representation of the resource
described through the url. The server provides the resource
representation in the form of a html document and the browser
parses it. The html document contains a number of links to
other resources, such as JavaScript code, videos, audios or
images (Figure 2). Some of these can be stored on the same
domain as the requested page, some may be requested to a
Fig. 1. Here we show an example of user profile expressed in absolute terms
by counting the number of keywords in each category for a browsing session.
We model user and advertising profiles as histograms of tags keywords a set
of predefined categories of interest.
third party services. Such is the case of services like Google
Analytics, share buttons from different social networks, or
advertising banners. Together with the http request, a number
of parameters are included. These contains keywords, users
preferences, information regarding the user device and session,
in page information sent to the third party service from the
website or application.
Fig. 2. Trackers on web pages make third-party http requests to advertising
services. These return ads content tailored to the user web history or expressed
preferences.
B. A metric of similarity
We consider the third party advertising network to oper-
ate like a recommendation system, that suggest products or
services that might be of interest for the user, based on their
preferences. A recommendation system can be described as an
information filtering system that seeks to predict if the user is
interested or not in a particular resource. We assume that the
ad server suggest advertising based on a measure of similarity.
We measure the user profile, as previously described, as an
histogram of their recorded preferences, and the advertising
profile as an histogram of the ads that the user has received. We
have considered a set of metric to measure how the advertising
network is tracking the user profile. We use the 1-norm as a
first measure of distance between the advertising profile and
the user profile:
‖pm − qn‖1 =
∑
l
|pml − qnl|
The 1-norm is related to the total variation distance com-
monly used in statistics when considered over a finite alphabet.
In this case, given two probability distributions, P and Q, over
a finite alphabet, we can relate the total variation distance to
the 1-norm as follows:
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
‖P −Q‖1 = 1
2
∑
l
|P (l)−Q(l)|
We also use the 2-norm as measurements of the distance
between the advertising network and the user profile:
‖pm − qn‖2 = (
∑
l
|pml − qnl|2)1/2
The 2-norm represents the Euclidean distance between the
two distributions. When considering the 2-norm it is possible
to highlight larger discrepancies on the set of categories
analysed.
Fig. 3. Advertising services work in a feedback loop. The image illustrate
how while a user surf a number of web pages, the service record their profile
and adapts the returned advertising.
Advertising services are complex recommendation systems
working in a feedback loop (Figure 3). When a user surfs the
web each tracker on the visited pages communicates with the
advertising service, sending a number of parameters through
http requests. These contain the user preferences and browsing
history which will be taken into consideration when ads are
returned to display on the page.
C. A metric of connectivity
We said that advertising networks or privacy attackers need
to be able to follow the user across as many website as possible
in order to profile their interests. We have therefore considered
that the average degree of the neighbourhood of each node is a
good indication of how many pages are connected to a certain
advertising service or tracking domain.
The average degree of the neighbourhood of a node i is
calculated as:
knn,i =
1
|N(i)|
∑
j∈N(i)
kj
Where N(i) are the neighbours of node i and kj is the
degree of node j which belongs to N(i).
If a certain tracker domain is connected to the majority
of the page visited by a certain user, this means that they
have been able to collect the user’s preferences and reading
activities across a number of websites. The more a tracker
domain is connected, the more the user might consider this a
risk for their privacy.
We have therefore used the average degree of the neigh-
bourhood of a tracker to rank tracker domains.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
We analysed the browsing habits of 86 users of Twitter, by
observing the set of 10 websites links shared for each of the
top categories from the Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [22].
We assumed that the articles shared on twitter are a subset of
the website that each users visit every day. More importantly
if they are active Twitter users, these websites will express
their interest bias towards certain categories. To validate our
strategy we observed that Twitter itself offer website owners
the possibility to track conversions on their pages coming from
tweets and twitter ads. Please note that the list of links was
only considered as a list of website visited, no interaction
between Twitter user was further taken into consideration.
These sites are therefore surfed in our simulation environ-
ment. This consist of a virtual box were a browser instance
visits a url and record both in page categories and third-party
requests. In this scenario we pretend that a user is going
through their reading list of sites and by looking at third-party
http requests we measure how the advertising changes in the
page and adapts to their profile. The user is simulated by a
software agent opening the urls and scrolling through the page
for a certain arbitrary amount of time.
It is important to note that in our simulated environment
the users are not logged a third-party account, like Google,
Facebook or Twitter. When the website is accessed a text
version of the page is recorded and analysed by our software
agent. In page keywords and meta information are extracted
and evaluated. We extracted keywords from the actual text of
the page by using the Rapid Automatic Keyword Extraction
(RAKE) [23] algorithm. Each keyword was then evaluated
against Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [22] for classification
within top levels categories.
Once the user profile was calculated the advertising profile
is evaluated. The advertising profile is extracted from url
parameters contained in third party requests. We have col-
lected information regarding each third party requests made
from each page visits. These parameters are again evaluated
against DMOZ for classification within top levels categories.
Please note that we have excluded request made to JavaScript
libraries, images and Cascade Style Sheet (CSS) files. We
have also excluded same domain requests, since we were only
interested in third-parties http calls.
By profiling users’ browsing events using a hypermedia
document structure we were able to show how each event
contains a set of features regarding the user identity and the
page that was visited. We have therefore categorised each
event by using the keywords contained in the meta information
present in the page and the page text itself (Figure 1). At each
event we ere able to calculate an event profile, by measuring
the set of keywords introduced by each action performed by
the user (i.e. visited a page).
For each user we considered a series of 15 pages visited
and we measured how the norm (both 1-norm and 2-norm)
between the measured advertising profile and the user profile
changed at each visit. We considered this strategy to follow
the intuition that advertising is probably tailored on historical
data up to the current page visit. Therefore new page visits
need a certain amount of time to be counted.
Fig. 4. The image show the 2-norm for a single user visiting a series of 15
pages.
In this scenario, we expected the norm to fluctuate and
quickly adapt to the user calculated profile. For this reasons
when evaluating the distance between the advertising profile
and the user profile we always considered the measured user
profile up to the current page visited (Figure 4).
We also considered a average measurement of how the norm
changes for the whole population of users evaluated, for a
series of 15 pages each (Figure 5 and 6).
It is interesting to note that in a short number of visits the
norm measurements for the entire population of users decrease
of approximately 5% for the 1-norm and 3% for the 2-norm.
For an individual user we see instead how the decrement in the
2-norm is more evident 4 with a decrement of approximately
35% in 15 pages visited.
By using our hypermedia model we also considered how
tracker domains are linked to pages. In this case we calculated
the average degree of the neighbourhood of each node, for
nodes corresponding to advertising services. Our results shows
how we were able to identify known tracker domains.
Fig. 5. The image show the average 1-norm for all the users in the experiment
visiting a series of 15 pages.
Fig. 6. The image show the average 2-norm for all the users in the experiment
visiting a series of 15 pages.
Fig. 7. The image show how Twitter feeds were used to construct users’
browsing histories to use in our experiment.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We measured how the norm adapt quickly to the user profile
in a short amount of pages visited to expose how advertising
networks are able to profile users even when they are not
logged into an identity account. This means that the networks
possess a large amount of information regarding users and
population of users to be able to predict fairly quickly user’s
preferences. This aspect is particularly interesting for the
development of Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the web.
Tracker domain avg knn,i
tacoda.at.atwola.com 180.0
bcp.crwdcntrl.net 180.0
match.prod.bidr.io 180.0
glitter.services.disqus.com 180.0
ad.afy11.net 180.0
idsync.rlcdn.com 180.0
mpp.vindicosuite.com 180.0
aka-cdn-ns.adtechus.com 180.0
clients6.google.com 180.0
i.simpli.fi 180.0
ads.p161.net’ 180.0
dis.criteo.com 180.0
ads.stickyadstv.com 180.0
cms.quantserve.com 180.0
ads.yahoo.com 129.0
graph.facebook.com 118.0
ib.adnxs.com 110.0
rs.gwallet.com 108.0
bid.g.doubleclick.net 98.333
googleads4.g.doubleclick.net 98.333
TABLE I
THE TABLE SHOWS THE TOP 20 IDENTIFIED TRACKER DOMAINS BASED
ON THE AVERAGE DEGREE OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD.
Up to now, anti-tracking technologies have been built to
simply stop third party requests, alternative strategies might
instead consider to send bogus information to certain over-
connected tracker domains to masquerade the user real profile.
At the same time a measurement of the average degree of the
neighbourhood of a certain third-party domain can be used to
evaluate how dangerous this can be considered for the user’s
privacy. In future research we would like to further explore the
hypermedia model introduced, while continuing to understand
how quickly web advertising is able to match the served ads
with the actual user profile. This would allow us to understand
if different profiles for the same users can be somehow linked
together within similar advertising networks. We are also par-
ticularly interested in measuring how social networks sharing
buttons and/or commenting services, included on websites,
are able to track users even when these have not signed in
with their account. We reserve the study of their capabilities
to future investigations. More over we want to enlarge the
set of users analysed by testing on logs from a real world
small computer network, while also introducing new metrics
to our study. In particular we are already planning to consider:
the KL-Divergence between the advertising profile and the
observed user profile. We also believe in the importance to
provide users with simple visualisation tools able to show the
user their online footprint and allowing them to take action
to masquerade their interests profile or simply block certain
networks.
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